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Previous research suggests a discrepancy between perceptions of online security and the 
level of privacy actually achieved.  For example, the information made publically 
available on Facebook profiles can be used to answer popular security questions.  This 
poses a risk for white-collar crime, whereby someone in a position of power manipulates 
others for financial gain.  Examining whether individuals recognize the risk for white-
collar crime is therefore an important step towards internet security.  Active Facebook 
users (n = 501, Mage = 26.12 years) completed an online survey assessing online 
behaviour.  Approximately half of participants had an experience where their privacy was 
compromised online.  Despite these experiences, white-collar crimes were perceived as 
less serious than other online threats and participants failed to recognize the risk of 
providing information online.  Education about safe online practices may be needed to 
raise awareness and to reduce the risk for online crime due to online disclosure.
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“Despite My Security Settings…”: Online Behaviour and Perceptions of White-Collar 
Crime 
  White-collar crime, better known as corporate crime, has been redefined over the 
years (Shapiro,1980; Simpson, 2013).  Its definition has been a controversial issue among 
researchers (Helmkamp et al., 1996; Simpson, 2013).  It was originally classified as the 
sophisticated crime within a corporate business by Edwin Sutherland in 1939 
(Sutherland, 1940; Simpson, 2013).  White-collar criminals were believed to be people of 
high socioeconomic status and power within corporations (Abel, 1945; Sutherland, 1940; 
1945).  However, white-collar crime can extend beyond the corporate offices.  Arguably, 
white-collar crime can be classified today as crimes whereby those in positions of power 
deceive others for financial gain (“White-Collar Crime,” n.d.).  Such a definition 
encompasses the various forms of white-collar crimes and the means by which it may 
occur.  The foundation for these crimes is in the abuse of trust and in the manipulation of 
others (Shapiro, 1990).  
Hidden behind a computer screen, a white-collar criminal need only be in a 
position of power relative to his/her victim to commit the crime, and not necessarily a 
corporate powerhouse.  Given the ease of access to personal information online, white-
collar crimes can be easier to commit.  While it is true that there are online security 
measures to protect against threats, there are loopholes.  Specifically, the information 
made available on Facebook may be used to answer the security questions we use to 
protect our online information (e.g., online banking accounts).  Thus, it is important to 
assess perceptions of white collar crime on the internet because despite security settings, 
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white-collar criminals can access crucial personal information.  As online behaviours 
evolve, awareness and practice of online security must also advance.   
Perceptions Versus the Reality of White-collar Crime 
White-collar crime poses both a significant social and financial threat to victims 
(Abel, 2008).  Fraud costs Canadians an estimated 10 billion dollars annually, besides the 
emotional devastation of its victims (“Fraud costs Canadians $10B annually: RNC,” 
2010).  Victims may also feel guilty, embarrassed, frustrated and angry that their trust 
was abused and they may lose faith in powerful people (Sutherland, 1940).  The 
exploitation of trust may deter victims from trusting ever again: a lifelong social 
consequence.  For this reason, forms of white-collar crime, including fraud and identity 
theft are now on the radar of the FBI and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(“Corporate Crime,” 2012; “Fraud costs Canadians,” 2010).  For example, the FBI lists 
tips for online security to warn the public about the risks of sharing too much personal 
information, and falling for scams online (http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar, n.d.).  
Despite the severity of its consequences, white-collar crime is perceived as less 
serious than other forms of crime (Holtfreter, Skyle, Bratton & Gertz, 2008; 
Rosenmerkel, 2001; Rossi, Bose & Berk, 1974).   For example, when Rosenmerkel 
(2001) asked participants to rate various crimes in seriousness, wrongfulness and 
harmfulness, white-collar crime was rated as being less serious, wrong and harmful than 
violent crimes. Similarly, Rossi et al. (1974) found when participants were presented with 
a list of 140 crimes white-collar crimes were ranked lower in perceived seriousness than 
most of the other crimes listed.  The majority of participants believed that violent 
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offenders, as opposed to white-collar offenders, would and should receive harsher 
punishments than their white collar counterparts (Holtfreter et al., 2008).  It has been 
suggested that white-collar crime is seen as less serious than other forms of crimes 
because with the lack of direct physical contact, it is deemed victimless (Rosenmerkel, 
2001).  
To date, no studies have assessed perceptions of white-collar crime on the 
internet.  Online fraud, identity theft and Ponzi schemes are just a few of the threats 
online users face.  To defend or guard against such crimes, internet users use security 
measures such as security questions to protect their personal information.  Yet, research 
to date has not assessed the perception of such crimes in terms of frequency for potential 
victimization.    
The Role and Risk of Security Questions 
Security questions, also known as challenge or personal verification questions, are 
used to confirm a user’s identity when he/she has forgotten, or needs to change, a 
password (Just, 2004; Rabkin, 2008).  For example, security questions are used for online 
banking, e-mail and Facebook accounts.  Users may choose from a pool of security 
questions and create an answer that can confirm their identity.  These questions are 
designed to trigger personal long term memories, thus the answers need not be 
memorized (Rabkin, 2008).   
There are basic characteristics that make a personal verification question usable. 
First, the answer to the question must be simple and easy to remember (Rosen, 2007; 
Scoville, 2010).  If the security question does not quickly trigger a memory, the 
individual will struggle to recall the answer to the question (Just, 2004; Rabkin, 2008).  A 
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vague security question can pose a problem for users because answers are wide-ranging, 
and will not trigger the memory of the user (Just, 2004; Rabkin, 2008).  A question such 
as “What was your dream job as a child?” poses a problem because people may have 
dreamed of a number of jobs throughout their childhood (e.g., doctor, nurse, firefighter, 
veterinarian, chef, teacher).  Second, a usable security question should allow for a variety 
of answers among all users of that online program so that not many people share the same 
security answers (Rosen, 2007; Scoville, 2010).  An inapplicable security question, or 
one that is irrelevant to the personal lives of consumers, means that it is just too specific 
to be used by many diverse people (Just, 2004; Rabkin, 2008).  For example, asking 
security questions about dogs is inapplicable because not everyone owns a dog; questions 
should be generalizable to users of online security.  Third, a security question must also 
be definitive and stable so that the answer does not change over time (Just, 2004; Rosen, 
2007; Scoville, 2010).  Last, the answer to the security question should be difficult to 
guess or determine by studying personal details about the individual (Just 2004; Rabkin, 
2008).  
Websites dedicated to online security suggest there is no “good” security question 
(Rosen, 2007; Scoville, 2010).  There is a trade-off between the usability of a security 
question and the security of the question (Just, 2004).  For example, the more 
complicated the answer to the security question is, the more difficult it is to remember 
and recall quickly.  However, a simple answer may pose a security risk as it could be 
easy to search for this information.  Many security questions are undeniably attackable in 
that the answers can be obtained by those other than the user (Rabkin, 2008).  Common 
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topics among security questions in major online banks include family names and 
favourite things (Rabkin, 2008).    
Rabkin (2008) coined the term, “automatically attackable” to refer to security 
questions that could be answered using information collected from social networking 
sites such as Facebook (p. 5).  Rabkin (2008) found that 12% of the online bank security 
questions examined were automatically attackable.  A compromised Facebook account 
could indeed be problematic because someone can act as the puppeteer behind another’s 
Facebook account, while remaining undetected.  This means not only does the person 
have access to someone’s personal settings, Facebook friends, photographs and statuses, 
but he/she can also view and change the personal details in the account.  Yet, the risk is 
not excluded to having someone else behind the Facebook account (Rabkin, 2008).  The 
amount of public information available online through social media sites could very well 
pose a security threat.  Accessible information on a Facebook profile could help others 
break into the Facebook account or other online accounts by providing answers to 
security questions.  
Common security questions can be broken down into 10 categories based on 
themes in the questions and answers.  The largest categories are family related, (e.g., 
What is your mother’s maiden name?), location related (e.g., In what city or town was 
your first job?), history related questions (e.g., What is the first car you ever owned) and 
education related questions (e.g., What is the last name of your first grade teacher?).  
Other categories include: animal related (e.g.,. What is the name of your first pet?); 
personal interest related (e.g., Who was your childhood hero?); personal characteristics 
(e.g., what is the color of your eyes?); work related (e.g., What is the name of the 
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company of your first job?); life event related (e.g., What month and day is your 
anniversary?); and personal contact information (e.g., What is your address?) questions.  
It is important to organize the type of security questions that are commonly used because 
the information provided on Facebook may be similarly categorized.  As Rabkin (2008) 
noted, information about family members and favourite things are not hard to discover on 
a social media profile.  
The Risk of Facebook 
Social media sites, such as Facebook, are potentially putting users at risk for 
online white-collar crime.  Privacy and security concerns are rising with the increasing 
popularity of Facebook (Lemieux, 2012).  Millions of Facebook users share personal 
information on their profiles for Facebook friends and strangers to see (Houghton & 
Joinson, 2010).  As of March 2013, Facebook reached 1.11 billion users, with 665 
million users logging on per day (The Associated Press, 2013).  Of its active users, not 
everyone has the highest privacy settings necessary to protect their personal details, 
details that can be used to answer security questions.  Is it really that easy?  Yes it is.  In 
September of 2012, a man named Dave had individuals recruited for a psychic reading.  
Dave astounded participants with his ability to know of their hidden tattoos, house for 
sale, motorcycle color, and even spending habits (Guillaume, 2012). Before he was done 
however, the black screen behind Dave dropped to reveal that all of the personal 
information had been obtained in live-time from details available on the internet. The 
participants were shown a screen reading, “Your entire life is online.  It might be used 
against you” (Guillaume, 2012).  More recently, a Canadian woman learned that posting 
about an absence away from home could have serious consequences; she was robbed of 
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$20,000 worth of goods while she was out of town and blamed her Facebook post for 
alerting robbers to the empty home (Ramachandran, 2013).  
Personal information is bountiful on social media profiles (Christofides, Muise & 
Desmarais, 2009; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Lemieux, 2012; Sophos, 2009).  Facebook 
prompts users to add photographs, check in at various locations, list family members, and 
to create a timeline of life events.  With details at risk, users would benefit from hyper 
vigilant behaviours in protecting their privacy.  However, Facebook users sometimes 
accept a stranger’s friend request and consequently give up personal information to the 
individual behind the account (Lemieux, 2012; Sophos, 2009).  In an assessment of this, 
Lemieux created a gender neutral Facebook account and friend requested 450 graduate 
students on campus.  The profile of Jamie Marple was made to look like an active 
Facebook user through the correspondence of accomplices (Lemieux, 2012).  A total of 
325 students friended Jamie Marple without ever meeting or knowing who he/she was. 
 Similarly, in 2007, Sophos online security company conducted a study using 
“Freddi Staur”, a Facebook account with a profile picture of a toy frog (Sophos, 2009).  
“Freddi” friend requested 200 Facebook users and was accepted by 87 (Sophos, 2009).  A 
total of 72% of respondents provided an e-mail address, 84% gave their full birthday, 
87% listed their education or workplace, 78% gave their current address/location, and 
23% listed their current phone number (Sophos, 2009).  Additional sensitive information 
was made available such as resumes, family names and personal details (Sophos, 2009).  
It is this information that when made available to others, can be used to answer security 
questions.  
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More recently, Christofides et al. (2009) examined the Facebook profiles of 343 
students at an undergraduate institution.  They found that 85% of participants gave their 
e-mail address, 85% shared their hometown, and 72% shared their school and program. 
Almost all participants (97%) were members of a network, or a group, on Facebook.  In a 
Facebook group, such as those created for clubs, similar interests, or graduating classes, 
members can be viewed by everyone else in the group.  For example, the popular 
Facebook game, Candy Crush Saga, has brought in over 50 million monthly players 
(https://developers.facebook.com/docs/showcase/candycrushsaga/, n.d.).  As part of the 
game, players may ask Facebook friends for assistance to improve their achievements in 
the game.  Consequently, Facebook groups have emerged where strangers interact and 
help each other through the levels of Candy Crush.  As of April 2014, one such group 
held 38,607 members (“Candy Crush Saga All Help,” n.d.).  Being part of such a group 
offers the profile to 38,606 people (Christofides et al., 2009).  One does not have to 
accept someone as a Facebook friend to view information on his/her profile.  Individuals 
who are not Facebook friends may be able to access personal details if the privacy 
settings of the account make it available to public viewers.  Group members may not be 
aware of privacy settings within the group, or may not be aware of what they are 
revealing online.  
Learning how to manipulate Facebook to gain power over others is not as difficult 
as one may think.  Websites which describe how to hack into the Facebook accounts of 
others are easily accessible via the internet (Praveen, 2012).  Such websites provide 
instructions on how to determine answers to security questions using social media sites 
and search engines (Praveen, 2012).  With opportunity and effort, one could certainly 
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gain access to a person’s Facebook account and either find answers to security questions 
from information viewable to the public or from inside the account.  By being inside the 
Facebook profile, perpetrators can obtain extensive personal information.  They may also 
take advantage of having somebody else’s identity.  One risk for deception for financial 
gain is family members or friends being asked for money.  Individuals could also 
manipulate Facebook to commit white-collar crime by gaining access to other personal 
accounts, such as e-mail accounts or online banking through the information provided by 
Facebook.  For example, online bank accounts ask for personal verification before 
allowing access to banking information.  
Facebook allows users to access personal information about even their closest 
friends (Chaulk & Jones, 2011).  Chaulk and Jones examined how obsessive relational 
intrusion can be expressed in online contact and behaviour.  Of the 230 individuals 
surveyed, 75% claimed to have used Facebook profiles to obtain information about an 
acquaintance, while 70% did so for a close friend and 52% did so for an ex-partner 
(Chaulk & Jones, 2011).  Similarly, Alexander (2011) noted that Facebook users show 
increased cyber monitoring for their romantic partners.  This means that users watch the 
online behaviours of their partners by observing the adding of Facebook friends, wall 
posts and photos (Alexander, 2011).  Facebook is clearly being used as a “surveillance 
tool” (Alexander, 2011, p. 24).  However, only 41% of participants in Chaulk and Jones 
believed that acquaintances had used their profile to determine information about them.  
While people are invading the privacy of others, not everyone believes they are victims 
of the same surveillance behaviours.   
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The Illusion of Control 
In Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, users must agree to 
“[not] do anything else that might jeopardize the security of [their] account” (“Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities,” 2013).  Yet, merely including personal details on a 
profile poses a threat to security.  Users must agree to the Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities (SRR), which states the relationship Facebook has with its users and 
others, in order to use Facebook (“Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,” 2013).  In 
the same way, Facebook’s Data Use Policy educates users on how their information may 
or may not be used (Data Use Policy, 2013).  It contains details regarding the use of 
user’s information by Facebook and third parties (Data Use Policy, 2013).  For example, 
all Facebook pages are public, thus any information posted on a page becomes available 
to anyone and everyone (Data Use Policy, 2013).  Furthermore, if a user decides to delete 
his/her account, it is not deleted immediately; there is a time lapse before the information 
is removed (Data Use Policy, 2013).  Information can be stored for up to 90 days after an 
account is deleted (Data Use Policy, 2013).  In the Data Use Policy (2013), Facebook 
warns its users that even if a profile is privatized so that it cannot be searched by others it 
is still accessible.  For example, if someone has the username of the profile, known as the 
User ID or User URL, the username can be added to Facebook’s URL and it will open 
the public profile of the target.  Using a user’s Facebook username is one of the steps 
described in hacking into a Facebook account (Praveen, 2012).  
Do Facebook’s SRR and Data Use Policies demonstrate good online security?  
The argument appears to be that they do not.  Facebook does offer its users control over 
their privacy, but there are limitations in how much privacy control users have 
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(Christofides, Muise, & Desmarais, 2012).  For example, profile pictures are always 
publically available (Data Use Policy, 2013).  Furthermore, users may not be aware of 
where to find privacy settings as they are not easily labeled to suit the needs of all users 
(i.e., young and old) (Christofides et al., 2012).  Facebook’s Data Use Policy describes 
how to check what information is available about the person but it is deep within the 
lengthy script and not obvious to the reader.  This raises a concern that users may not 
fully read nor understand the information in Facebook’s policies.  
The illusion of control can be dangerous to Facebook users’ privacy.  Simply put, 
not everyone is aware of the risks.  To demonstrate, Stutzman, Capra and Thompson 
(2011) surveyed university Facebook users on privacy attitudes, use of privacy settings, 
the intake and understanding of Facebook’s privacy policy and information disclosed on 
Facebook.  A total of 87% of participants changed and customized their Facebook 
privacy settings from the default settings, demonstrating their use of control when 
available (Stutzman et al., 2011).  However, the study revealed that only the privacy 
concern of information leakage (out of identity theft, hackers, blackmail and cyber-
stalking) increased the use of such privacy protecting behaviours (Stutzman et al., 2011).  
This suggests that people may not perceive a risk for other considerable online threats 
such as white-collar crime.  The fact that the perception of risk fluctuates amongst users, 
when the risk is always present, is concerning.  Only those who held a great concern for 
privacy read most or all of Facebook’s privacy policy instead of scanning it and disclosed 
less on Facebook (Stuzman et al., 2011).  Customization of who could view information 
on the profile doubled the likelihood that users would disclose a lot of personal 
information online (Stuzman et al., 2011).  This suggests that perceptions of control lead 
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to more disclosure because Facebook users feel safer posting particular information.  Yet 
if this perception is an illusion, there is still a risk in posting personal details.  In reality, 
the risks exist for those who are concerned and those who are not.  Consumers of 
Facebook have very little control according to the Data Use Policy and SRR.  It is crucial 
to educate users who are unaware of Facebook’s risks.  
Why Do People Still Use Facebook? 
The benefits of using Facebook seem to outweigh the risks for many users 
(Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn & Hughs, 2009).  Users must provide substantial information to 
be found on Facebook, where they can participate in rewarding social interactions 
(Christofides et al., 2012).  It may not be possible or advisable to discourage people from 
using Facebook.  However, there may be other measures that can be taken to decrease 
security threats such as identity theft and/or fraud (Christofides et al., 2012).  For 
example, there is a need to encourage Facebook users to be aware of, and to use strict 
privacy settings before negative interactions happen.  In a study assessing adolescents’ 
perceptions of Facebook privacy and bad experience, Christofides et al. found a 
significant positive relationship between having a bad experience on Facebook and 
knowledge of the privacy settings (Christofides et al., 2012).  Thus, those who had a 
negative experience on Facebook were more likely to understand and use their privacy 
settings on Facebook (Christofides et al., 2012).  Christofides et al. found that 26.7% of 
surveyed adolescents had experienced a specific negative experience on Facebook, such 
as bullying, unintended disclosure, and unwanted contact.  Yet, they remained on 
Facebook. 
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The online experiences users have on Facebook clearly influence how people use 
the webpage.  Those who have a bad experience on Facebook are more likely to practice 
safer online behaviours and to become more aware of privacy settings (Christofides et al., 
2012).  Furthermore, Facebook users are more likely to make protective changes to their 
Facebook account when they perceive a personal risk (Debatin et al., 2009).  Likewise, 
Debatin et al. found that most users were aware of Facebook’s privacy concerns and 
consequently restricted their profiles, but those who were not familiar with privacy risks 
did not limit their profiles. Ideally, Facebook users should not have to have a negative 
experience to become more hyper vigilant about their privacy.  Including Facebook users 
in online research appears to be a great way to help them reassess their profiles and the 
type of information being made available (Nosko et al., 2012).  The void in current 
literature needs to be filled to decrease the likelihood of negative Facebook experiences 
for its users. 
Present Study 
There is a need to explore perceptions of white-collar crime in online behaviour 
and to determine how Facebook users are at risk for white-collar crime such as identity 
theft and fraudulent scams.  If Facebook users do not recognize the risk for white-collar 
crime in the information given on their Facebook profiles, they may not be aware of the 
measures they can take to protect their overall privacy.  The current study examined how 
Facebook users perceive their online security on Facebook and explored the possibility 
for modern day white-collar crime.  There are practical implications to the current study 
because businesses, such as Facebook, can learn whether changes are needed to protect 
the security of consumers.  To assess these issues, a survey was developed to examine 
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perceptions of online behaviour and the risk for white-collar crime on Facebook.  The 
survey assessed knowledge and understanding of privacy policies, risky behaviours, 
perceptions of white-collar crime compared to other online behaviours, and whether 
people identified the risk for online crime, including white-collar offenses, based on 
online disclosure.  The survey also examined perceptions of a scenario depicting white-
collar crime, including the best course of action, victim responsibility and the likelihood 
of the perpetrator being caught.  Multiple hypotheses were developed related to the 
primary goals of the study.  
Hypothesis #1: Facebook users would not recognize how particular information on a 
Facebook profile could be used to put someone at risk for a variety of online threats, 
including white-collar crime.  Because Facebook users are revealing so much 
information, both to external viewers and to those whom they have as Facebook friends, 
this suggests that they do not recognize the relationship between the type of information 
made available and the risk it could pose (Chaulk & Jones, 2011; Christofides et al., 
2009).  
Hypothesis #2: Participants will have had an experience where either their Facebook 
account, or another online account, was compromised.  Research into online security has 
demonstrated that obtaining personal information through Facebook is easy, and thus it is 
easy to break into online accounts using this information.  For example, personal 
information can be used to answer the security questions to online accounts (Christofides, 
et al., 2009; Just, 2003; Lemieux, 2012; Rabin, 2008; Sophos, 2009).  
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Hypothesis #3:Facebook users would rank white-collar crime as a less serious threat than 
other online behaviours.  Research into white-collar crime indicates that it is perceived as 
less serious than other forms of crime (Holtfreter et al., 2008; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Rossi 
et al., 1974).  Furthermore, potential forms of white-collar crime such as identity theft, 
hacking and blackmail were not enough to change the privacy behaviours of young 
Facebook users (Stutzman et al., 2011) 
Hypothesis #4: Active Facebook users would be engaging in online behaviours that 
decrease the privacy of themselves and others on Facebook, risking white collar crime.  
Previous research suggests that while Facebook users disclose information to enjoy social 
interactions, they are revealing details that can be used against them (Christofides et al., 
2009; Debatin et al., 2009; Sophos, 2009; Lemieux, 2012).  Furthermore, research 
suggests that Facebook users use the profiles of others to discover information about 
them, yet do not anticipate the same from others (Chaulk & Jones, 2011).  This implies 
that Facebook users do not perceive a personal risk from others viewing their profile.  
Behaviours that could put Facebook users at risk include not only using profiles to obtain 
information, but accepting strangers as Facebook friends, not being aware of Facebook’s 










 A sample of 522 participants was originally obtained for the purposes of this 
study.  However, only active Facebook users were included in data analysis.  Seven 
participants did not declare themselves as active Facebook users and were therefore 
omitted.  One participant was eliminated because the participant did not meet the 
minimum age requirement of 19 years.  An additional 13 participants were not included 
in data analysis because they left a large majority of the survey incomplete (only 
answered first 5 questions).  There was nothing in the data to indicate differences 
between those who did or did not complete the survey.  Therefore, a total of 501 
participants were used in this study, of which 329 were women, 82 were men, and 90 did 
not specify a gender.  The mean age of participants ranged from 19-66 (M =  26.12 years, 
SD = 9.68).  
Materials  
 For the purposes of this study, a survey was created using Survey Monkey.  
Before beginning the survey, participants were presented with an informed consent 
notice.  The informed consent notice provided participants with information regarding the 
risks and benefits of the study, confidentiality, anonymity and their right to end the 
survey at any time.  Names and contact information of the researchers were provided in 
case of questions or concerns.  A copy of the informed consent notice is available in 
Appendix A.  
The questionnaire assessed various online experiences and perceptions of online 
behaviours.  First, participants were questioned about their perceptions and awareness of 
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the privacy of their own Facebook profile.  These questions were answered either on a 
Likert scale or in a “yes/no” format.  Second, participants were asked about their 
experiences where online privacy may or may not have been jeopardized.  This included 
“yes/no” style questions, as well as open-ended questions where participants could detail 
their experiences.  Third, participants were asked about personal behaviours that could 
jeopardize the security of other Facebook users, such as whether they had ever viewed an 
online profile to gain information, and if so, how often they had viewed such profiles.  
Fourth, participants ranked six threatening online behaviours based on perceived 
seriousness.  
A scenario was used to assess perceptions of online behaviour.  The scenario 
detailed the information made available on an individual’s Facebook profile.  Perceptions 
of what personal information posted on Facebook could create a risk for specific online 
threats were assessed. The final question of the survey provided participants with 
statistics detailing what 200 Facebook users provided on their profiles and the risk for 
white-collar crime by posting this information. Participants were asked how concerned 
they were that the details made public on their own accounts could put them at risk.  
Before viewing a debriefing notice, participants were given the option to consent to 
having their own Facebook profile privacy assessed by the researcher as an additional 
component of the study.  A copy of the complete survey can be found in Appendix B.   
Following the survey, a debriefing notice was used to inform participants of the 
details of the study, as well as to provide additional contact information for mental health 
services.  A copy of the debriefing screen is included in Appendix C. 
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Only portions of the survey results were analyzed to assess the four hypotheses of 
the present study.  Specifically, participants’ indication of what pieces of information on 
a profile could put a user at risk for white-collar crime was assessed.  Furthermore, 
participant’ perceptions of their profile security, experiences of compromised privacy on 
Facebook and online, perceived concern for white-collar crime, and behaviours 
participants engage in while on Facebook were examined.  Additional results will be 
analyzed as part of a larger study to gain further understanding of perceptions of white-
collar crime.  For example, participants were given the option to have their public 
Facebook profiles examined for types of personal information that could be used to 
answer categories of security questions.  The participants who agreed will be contacted in 
the near future.       
Procedure 
 A link to a Survey Monkey questionnaire was provided on the researcher’s 
personal Facebook profile.  This survey was only viewable to the researcher’s Facebook 
friends.  These friends were informed that they could voluntarily complete the study if 
they were over the age of 19. Facebook friends were also given permission to share the 
survey link through their own profiles.  In an effort to recruit additional participants the 
link to the survey was also shared through the Grenfell Campus Messenger email, a daily 
email detailing ongoing events at Grenfell campus. 
Participants who followed the link to Survey Monkey were first asked to read an 
informed consent notice.  They were informed that the questionnaire assessed personal 
online experience and perceptions of online behaviour including the behaviour and 
experiences of an individual in a given scenario.  Participants were asked to only click 
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“Next” if they were over the age of 19 and were voluntarily consenting to participate in 
the study.  Participants were then able to begin the survey. 
 All participants completed the same survey questions in the same order with the 
exception of the third tier of the three-part scenario.  Participants either read that the 
individual was being blackmailed or that the individual’s email account was 
compromised.  All questions were originally inputted with the intent that participants 
would randomly be sent to scenarios with differing endings.  As a result of human error, 
of the 501 participants who were used in analysis, the first 256 received the blackmail 
scenario.  The error in randomization was discovered after 2 weeks of data collection, and 
the questionnaire was modified appropriately so that future participants would therefore 
only receive the email compromised scenario. There was no indication made to 
participants that they would receive either scenario, nor that there was more than one 
scenario available to read.  For the purpose of this study, only answers to the first part of 
this scenario, which all participants received, was analyzed.  The questionnaire link was 
made available for a total duration of 1 month.  
 After completing the survey, participants were asked if they would be interested 
in having their Facebook profile examined by the researcher from a Facebook account 
created solely for the purpose of this study.  They were informed that the researcher could 
assess the type of information made public on the participant’s Facebook account and 
could compare that information to common security questions.  Participants would then 
be asked to confirm only the number of questions which could be accurately answered 
with the information (e.g., favorite movie).  A summary of information obtained from the 
participant’s profile would be made available to him/her.  If consent was given, 
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participants were provided with the researcher’s e-mail to contact her directly.  This 
information is not included in this thesis but rather will be collected as part of future 
research on the topic matter.  All participants were provided with a debriefing notice after 
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Results 
 A series of descriptive and inferential statistics were used to interpret participants’ 
understanding of the risk of exposure to white collar crime on the internet, participants’ 
own negative online experiences, participants’ ratings of white collar crimes relative to 
other online threats, and the behaviours participants reported engaging in during online 
activity that could potentially put themselves and others at risk.  Gender differences were 
not examined there were large discrepancies between the number of men and women.  
Recognition of Risk 
 To determine whether active Facebook users recognize their risk for exposure to 
white-collar crime in the details posted on their Facebook profiles, participants were 
provided with a list of 10 pieces of information commonly posted on Facebook profiles 
(e.g., pet’s name, hometown, graduation class) that can either be used as answers or clues 
to answers for common security questions.  Participants were asked to indicate what 
pieces of  information from those listed could put someone at risk for deception for the 
purpose of financial gain and a number of other online threats.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
proportion of participants indicating specific pieces of information that would put an 
individual at risk for deception for the purpose of financial gain.   The other online threats 
surveyed will not be analyzed for the purposes of the current study. 
 Participants, upon completing the entire survey, were finally asked a question 
regarding their concern for white-collar crime.  They were informed that the information 
commonly posted online (e.g., Hometown) can answer security questions.  Four-hundred 
and thirteen participants rated their average concern from 1 (Not concerned at all) to 5 
(Very concerned) to be 3.39 (SD  = 1.15).   





































Experiences of Compromised Privacy       
 To assess whether online security breaches are common, participants were asked 
whether someone had ever logged into their Facebook account without the participant’s 
knowledge or consent.  Twenty-six percent of participants representing 129 individuals 
indicated that they had had an experience where someone signed into their Facebook 
profile without their knowledge or consent.  As a more general measure of Facebook 
security, participants were asked whether they had ever had an experience where they felt 
their privacy was compromised on Facebook.  A total of 184 respondents representing 
Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who identified risk for white-collar crime based on given 
information. 
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37.1% of the sample indicated that yes they had.  When participants were asked if they 
had ever had an experience where they felt that their privacy had been compromised on 
an online e-mail account, online bank account, or on the internet in general, 42.2% of 
individuals representing 208 respondents said yes.  
Participants whose privacy was compromised online in general briefly described 
the experience.  The majority of experiences (61.8%) described involved the participant 
losing control of an e-mail account (N = 84).  However, 15 participants (11%) of those 
who elected to describe an experience, described one whereby an online baking account 
was compromised, or rather, the owner lost control.  A further breakdown of responses 
can be seen in Figure 2.   














Figure 2. Participant experiences whereby privacy was compromised online. 
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Ranking of Threats 
To determine whether white-collar crime was perceived as less serious than other 
risky online activities, participants were asked to rank six online behaviours from 1 (Most 
serious) to 6 (Least serious). Unfortunately, a number of participants misunderstood the 
question and did not differentiate between the six online behaviours but rather ranked the 
severity of each behaviour on a scale of 1 to 6. For example, participants identified two 
behaviours as being the most serious by ranking them both as 1 (Most serious). Those 
who misunderstood the question were excluded from the analysis leaving a total of 340 
participants.  Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations of 
participant responses, can be seen in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Average Ranking of Perceived Seriousness of Online Threats  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Online threat   M   SD   n 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Identity theft   2.08   1.52   340 
Bullying/harassment  2.77   1.48   340 
White-collar crime  3.30   1.20   340 
Tracking   3.42   1.29   340 
Third party usage  4.22   1.24   340 
Gossip    5.16   1.59   340 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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A repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze where participants ranked the 
behaviours in terms of severity.  Mauchley’s test of sphericity was violated and for that 
reason, Greenhouse Geiser was used to correct the violation.  The ANOVA indicated 
significant differences between the participants’ ratings of the six online behaviours, 
F(3.66, 1241.46) = 171.13,  p < .001, partial η2 = .34.  Post-hoc tests indicated that there 
was a significant difference between deception for the purpose of financial gain (white-
collar crime) and identity theft (mean difference = 0.53, p < .001).  The ranking for 
white-collar crime was also significantly different than bullying/harassment (mean 
difference = 1.221, p < .001), third party usage (mean difference = -0.92, p = < .001), and 
gossip (mean difference = -1.85, p < .001).  There was no significant difference found in 
ranking the severity of deception for the purpose of financial gain and the severity of 
personal information being used to track someone’s whereabouts (mean difference = -
0.12, p = .291). 
Behaviours 
To determine whether participants were engaging in behaviours that put 
themselves and others at risk, participants were asked a series of questions pertaining to 
their personal accounts, online behaviours and understanding of Facebook policies.  
When asked to rate the overall privacy of their Facebook accounts on a scale from 1 (Not 
private at all) to 5 (Completely private)  on average, participants rated the overall privacy 
of their accounts to be 3.04 (SD = 1.04, n = 500).  Only 25 respondents (5%) indicated 
that their accounts were fully private.  When asked about their practice of accepting 
Facebook friends, 47% of respondents, representing 233 participants, indicated that they 
had accepted a Facebook friend whom they did not know prior to Facebook contact.   
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Using Facebook without a full awareness or understanding of Facebook’s policies 
could be considered a risky online behaviour to the self.  Therefore, participants were 
asked questions regarding their awareness of Facebook’s Data Use Policy. Of 497 
respondents, 61% were unaware that Facebook has a Data Use Policy.  Of the 39% who 
were aware of the Data Use Policy, 91.2% had not fully read the policy (n = 194).  In 
order to assess the level at which those who had fully read the Data Use Policy felt they 
understood the policy, those who had fully read it were asked to rate their level of 
understanding of the complete policy.  Respondents indicated that on a scale from 1 (Do 
not understand) to 5 (Completely understand), on average, their level of understanding 
was 3.21 (SD = 1.03, n = 19).  Out of the 19 participants who had fully read it, only 2 
respondents indicated they completely understood the Data Use Policy.  
Of 497 respondents, 53.3% were unaware that Facebook has a Statement of 
Rights and Responsibilities (SRR).  Of the 46.7% who were aware of the SRR (265), 
94% of them indicated they had not fully read the Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities (n = 263). Out of the 15 participants who had fully read the SRR, the 
average understanding as rated from 1 (Do not understand) to 5 (Completely understand) 
was 3.13 (SD = 0.83).  No one indicated that they fully understood the SRR (n = 15).  
When Facebook users were asked about their viewing practices as they pertain to 
the public profiles of others, 97% of respondents (n = 491) indicated they had viewed 
someone’s public Facebook profile to determine information about that individual.  
Participants who did not deny viewing someone’s profile to gain information were asked 
to indicate on a scale of 1 (Never) to 5 (Almost always) how often they used Facebook 
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profiles to find information about someone else.  Among participants, the average 
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Discussion  
 Given that white-collar crime is an existing threat online, there are a multitude of 
questions regarding online security.  The present study, through the assessment of 
perceptions of online white-collar crime and online behavior, provides important 
answers.  Overall, it can be deduced that active Facebook users are not recognizing the 
risk for white-collar crime in the information commonly disclosed online.  Furthermore, 
active Facebook users are potentially disclosing personal information via Facebook that 
can be used to answer online security questions.  Despite the continuous risk for white-
collar crime, current perceptions do not match reality.  
Recognition of Risk for White-Collar Crime 
 The results of the study suggest that active Facebook users do not recognize the 
risk for white-collar crime associated with posting personal information online, thus 
supporting the first hypothesis.  Participants were provided with a list of personal details 
commonly posted on Facebook (e.g., High School graduation class) and were asked to 
indicate which of these could put someone at risk for white-collar crime.  The results 
overwhelmingly indicated that participants do not recognize that such information can be 
used to answer security questions.   
 The information flagged by the most participants as being risks for white-collar 
crime were providing first and last name, as well as current workplace.  However, just 
over one half of participants recognized providing these as being risky behaviour.  
Furthermore, less than 20% of participants recognized how posting a pet name and 
personal interests could be unsafe.  As previously explained, the ways in which security 
questions can be categorized (e.g., family related, location related, animal related, 
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personal interest related) corresponds with how information posted on Facebook can be 
organized.  The information that participants did not flag as unsafe to post can be used to 
answer corresponding questions such as “What is the name of your first pet?” or “What is 
your favourite band?”  These are common security questions (Just, 2004; Rabkin, 2008).  
For example, a Yahoo e-mail account could be secured with one of two security 
questions related to the user’s taste in music.  Considering that all of the information 
listed to respondents can answer, or provide clues to the answers for security questions, 
the percentages of participants recognizing that provision of such information is risky are 
considerably low. 
Reality versus Perception 
 An experience whereby personal information on Facebook is not in the control of 
the owner means that another individual may have an answer to an online security 
question.  It is a substantial concern that 184 of 469 participants (37%) indicated they had 
an experience on Facebook where they felt that their privacy was compromised.  This 
demonstrates that there are privacy risks when using Facebook.  Furthermore, 208 of 493 
individuals (42%) had an experience whereby they felt that their privacy was 
compromised online, outside of Facebook.  Of those who described their experience, the 
majority of incidents whereby privacy was violated involved e-mail accounts (n = 84) 
and online banking (n = 15).  This demonstrates a prevailing possibility for white-collar 
crime because personal information such as pay cheques and bank statements can arrive 
via personal e-mail addresses.  The second hypothesis was thus supported.   
 Despite evidence suggesting personal information is frequently jeopardized, 
participants ranked white-collar crime below two other online behaviours out of six.  
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Considering that white-collar crime is not seen as a serious crime compared to other 
offenses, it is not surprising that such perceptions have been carried into the online 
community (Holtfreter et al., 2008; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Rossi et al., 1974).  Participants 
ranked deception for the purpose of financial gain third in seriousness under identity theft 
and bullying/harassment, but above tracking, third party usage and gossip.  Therefore, the 
third hypothesis that white-collar crime would be rated as less serious than other online 
threats was partially supported.  Notably, it is a positive sign that identity theft was 
ranked as the most serious online behaviour.  Identity theft can be used as a step towards 
white-collar crime.  For example, a perpetrator may assume another’s identity to deceive 
others for financial gain or he/she could take out a bank account in the victim’s name.  
Furthermore, it is possible that bullying/harassment was seen as more serious than white-
collar crime due to its frequent appearance in the media.  Considering that only 16 of 240 
respondents ranked white-collar crime as the most serious issue, it is possible that lack of 
current attention is responsible.  While all the behaviours provided to participants are 
important and each has its own negative consequences, it is hopeful that future education 
will highlight white-collar crime as being dangerous both personally and financially 
(Abel, 2008).    
Implications of Risky Online Behaviours  
The results of the current study indicate that active Facebook users are engaging 
in behaviours that leave personal information open to white-collar criminals, supporting 
the fourth hypothesis.  It is this personal information that can be used to answer important 
security questions.  A number of examples of risky conduct emerged in the results of the 
survey.  For example, participants perceived their profile privacy to be lower than ideal, 
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which could mean that personal information is exposed.  In the survey, privacy was 
defined as the degree to which anybody other than Facebook friends could access profile 
information.  Participants indicated that on average, they believed their Facebook profile 
privacy was a 3.04 on a scale from 1 (Not private at all) to 5 (Completely private). This 
suggests that Facebook users are not taking advantage of the maximum level of privacy 
available on their Facebook accounts.  However, it may take a perceived personal risk or 
a negative experience before participants increase their security settings (Christofides et 
al., 2012; Debatin et al., 2009).  Regardless, there are simple steps to help increase 
privacy and reduce the chance of white-collar crime being committed through the stealing 
of personal information.  With maximum privacy settings, users can only show their 
name as indicated, and a profile photo of one’s choosing to a non-Facebook friend.  
Accounts can also be made non-searchable.  The ideal rating of privacy, indicative of 
maximized protection against online crime, would be 5/5. 
Another result supporting the hypothesis that active Facebook users are engaging 
in risky behaviours is the high number of participants who accepted strangers as 
Facebook friends.  A Facebook profile that offers information to the public (e.g., non-
Facebook friends) is not the only way to put the profile owner in danger.  For example, a 
pet’s name shown only on a private Facebook page is no longer protected when a 
stranger’s friend request is accepted.  Of 496 respondents, 233 indicated that they had 
accepted someone as a Facebook friend whom they did know prior to Facebook to 
contact. This suggests that nearly half (47%) of active Facebook users are allowing 
strangers to view their personal and complete profile.  Findings correspond with the 
outcomes of Sophos’ (2009) study, who demonstrated that 43.5% of contacted Facebook 
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users accepted an artificial Facebook user as a friend.  Accepting other Facebook users 
without a personal connection is common practice (Lemieux, 2012; Sophos, 2009).  This 
is exposing personal information to strangers who may then use that information in 
criminal activity.  A pet name can be used to answer or provide a clue to answer the 
security question, “What is the name of your favourite pet?”  Accepting strangers as 
Facebook friends exposes the entirety of posted information.  This also creates risk for 
other dangers such as stalking and unwanted contact.    
Facebook users are also engaging in behaviours that take advantage of personal 
information being readily available online.  When asked if they had ever examined a 
public Facebook profile to obtain information about the owner of the account, an 
overwhelming majority of participants (97%) indicated that they had.  Because almost all 
respondents claimed that they have used Facebook to find information about another 
person, this suggests Facebook is a source for obtaining information about others.  
However, Chalk and Jones (2011) found that over half of Facebook users denied that 
their accounts were used to determine information about them by acquaintances.  This 
indicates a reality far different than perception.  White-collar criminals can begin the 
process by using the profiles of others to obtain information.  The behaviours, as 
indicated to occur by respondents in the current study, show that Facebook users 
frequently begin this process.   
Facebook offers ways in which users may adjust the privacy settings on their 
personal profiles.  Information on how to change privacy settings, and also the limitations 
of privacy on Facebook, are available in the Data Use Policy and Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities.  The Data Use Policy is an essential document to understanding how 
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personal information posted on Facebook is used.  However, 61% of active Facebook 
users surveyed were unaware that the policy even existed.  This suggests that there may 
be some reason why the Data Use Policy is not a well-recognized document.  It is 
possible that users simply skim through the information, later forgetting it exists.  Of the 
194 participants who were aware of the Data Use Policy, only 17 (8.8%) respondents had 
fully read the document.  Of those 17, only two indicated that they fully understood it.  
Considering its importance, there may be a common reason why so few respondents had 
fully read the Data Use Policy.  As it is a lengthy read, perhaps it is intimidating and 
difficult to understand.  For example, the Data Use Policy consists of 9000 words and 
extends over seven pages when printed from the webpage.  While Facebook has made 
changes to improve the layout of the Data Use Policy, the content remains the same.  
Thus far, conclusions regarding the Data Use Policy are based on personal investigation 
by the researcher.  Further research would be of benefit.   
Similarly, nearly half of participants were unaware of the Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities (SRR).  This is worrisome as the SRR must be read, acknowledged and 
accepted before anyone can use Facebook.  Almost all who were aware of the SRR 
indicated that they had not fully read the document (94%).  Like the Data Use Policy, at 
first glance the SRR appears to be a daunting read in terms of length, language and 
presentation style.  For example, the SRR is nearly 4500 words and is six pages long.  In 
the opinion of the researcher, it presents as a legal document with overly intricate 
wording for the layperson.  Consider the following statement from the SRR, “you grant 
us non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any 
IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License)” (Statement of 
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Rights and Responsibilities, 2013).  Long sentences, undefined terms and small font may 
pose a problem.  No participant in the current study indicated that they fully understood 
the policy.  It must be considered however, that only the few who had fully read the SRR 
were asked to indicate understanding.  Notably, users who did not fully read the SRR 
were not prompted to investigate the Data Use Policy, as the SRR encourages Facebook 
users to read and maintain knowledge of its policies.    
Limitations and Future Research 
There were potential limitations to the current study which must be taken into 
consideration.  First, the methods by which the surveys were distributed may have limited 
the generalizability of the results to a larger and more diverse population. The survey link 
was made available on Facebook and through an e-mail newsletter specific to the 
Grenfell Campus.  The link for the survey was posted on the researcher’s personal page 
and viewable to her Facebook friends.  Furthermore, because the survey was shared over 
Grenfell Messenger, only students and staff of Grenfell Campus were recruited outside of 
Facebook.      
Second, this survey relied heavily upon participant memory.  By questioning 
participant memory of privacy settings, online experiences, and Facebook policies, there 
was a potential for absent or inaccurate responses.  For example, participants may have 
indeed read and accepted Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, but 
forgotten this when completing the current survey.       
 Considering the results of the present study, there is opportunity for future 
research.  Future research into white-collar crime could benefit from assessing youth 
under the age of 19 in their perceptions of white-collar crime and the risks of posting 
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personal information.  Assessing a younger sample would fill a gap in the literature 
regarding the online habits of the younger generations who have grown up using the 
internet as a common tool.  For example, Facebook will currently not allow anyone under 
the age of 13 to use the website.  However, this leaves a number of unanswered 
questions.  Can 13-year-olds recognize the risk for white-collar crime in posting their 
personal information? Are their perceptions for threat higher or lower than an older 
sample?  If Facebook use can begin at age 13, there is a chance to examine perceptions 
that, with age, may influence the privacy of online accounts (e.g., online baking, online 
purchasing, emails).  
Second, the current project assessed the recognition of white-collar crime online.  
Future research could assess the impact of education in online security.  For example, 
education could include outlining the specific ways in which the personal details put on 
the internet (e.g., hometown) could be used to answer common security questions (e.g., 
where did you have your first kiss?).  Questions which could be pursued include: Does 
education make a difference in perceptions of white-collar crime online? Does education 
lead Facebook users to increase privacy settings?   
Third, the substantial unawareness regarding Facebook’s Data Use Policy and 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (SRR) suggests that the next step in research 
should look closer at problems within Facebook which may contribute to the prevalence 
of white-collar crime.  Some practical questions to ask would be: Is there a reason 
awareness in this sample was so low? Is there a reason some users are not fully reading 
nor understanding the policies Facebook implements? Are there features Facebook users 
would like to see implemented to better protect their personal information? By obtaining 
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a better understanding of problems within Facebook that may lead someone to skip 
potentially useful information (e.g., limitations to privacy of personal information, 
privacy control options), we may be able to understand how Facebook can take measures 
to better protect its consumers. 
Conclusion  
  White-collar crime is a present-day concern for Facebook users, whether they 
recognize it or not.  White-collar crime, manifesting in the abuse of trust and power for 
money, exists all around us.  For example, in the recent case of missing student Loretta 
Saunders, there was an attempt at white-collar crime through Loretta’s cell phone.  The 
perpetrator in the case impersonated Loretta via text message, and asked Loretta’s 
boyfriend to remind Loretta of her mother’s maiden name (“Loretta Saunders's boyfriend: 
'She meant everything to me,” 2014).  This example is meaningful as a mother’s maiden 
name is a common security question for online banking.  Correctly answering security 
questions opens up a world of financial gain to perpetrators who can successfully do so.  
Previous research, pranks, crimes and news reports have all demonstrated that security 
questions, such as a mother’s maiden name, can be easily answered by the copious 
amounts of personal information available online (Christofides et al., 2009; Lemieux, 
2012; Rabkin, 2008; Sophos, 2009).  Results of the current study correspond with 
previous research in that Facebook users are engaging in behaviours that expose their 
personal information, and they do not recognize the risk for white-collar crime in doing 
so.  With further research and education into online security, the safety of Facebook users 
will expectantly improve over time.  Facebook users have the right to be informed so as 
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to best protect their personal information, and with that, the integrity of their online 
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Appendix A 
Survey of Online Behaviour (Informed consent) 
 The purpose of this informed consent statement is to ensure that you understand 
the nature of the present study and your involvement in it. This study is being conducted 
by Katherine Rose as part of the course requirements for Psychology 4951 and 
Psychology 4959. I am under the supervision of Dr. Kelly Warren. The results of this 
study will be used to write a thesis, as a requirement of the honours program at Grenfell 
Campus, Memorial University of Newfoundland. The results of this thesis may be 
published in the future. The purpose of the study is to examine perceptions of online 
behaviour. 
The survey should take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. You will be 
asked to answer questions based on your personal online experiences and perceptions of 
online behaviour. Lastly, you will be presented with a scenario about someone else’s 
online behaviour and experiences. You will be asked to answer questions based on your 
perceptions of the scenario. There are no wrong or right answers; I am only interested in 
your opinion. There are no obvious risks or benefits involved with your participation. All 
responses will remain anonymous and confidential. Results will be analyzed as group 
data. Please do not give away any identifying information. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time. If you have any 
questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at krose@grenfell.mun.ca or my 
supervisor, Dr. Kelly Warren, at kwarren@grenfell.mun.ca. 
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Appendix B 
Survey of Online Behaviour 
 
1. Are you an active Facebook user?  
Active Facebook: A user who logs into their Facebook account at least once every 30 
days 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
2. How private do you believe your personal Facebook account is?  
Private: the degree to which anybody other than your Facebook friends can access your 
profile information. The more private an account is, the harder it is for others to access 
your profile. information. 
1                2           3                4           5 
Not private at all               Completely private 
 
3. Are you aware that Facebook has a Data Use Policy? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
a. (If answered YES to #3) Have you fully read the 
Facebook Data Use Policy?  
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
b. (If answered YES to #3) How well do you understand 
the information in Facebook’s Data Use Policy? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Do not understand         Completely understand 
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4. Are you aware that Facebook has a Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (SRR)? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
a. (If answered YES to #4) Have you fully read the 
Facebook Statements of Rights and Responsibilities 
(SRR)? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
b. (If answered YES to #4) How well do you understand 
the information in the Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities (SRR)? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Do not understand                     Completely understand 
 
5. Have you ever accepted a Facebook Friend who you did not know prior to Facebook 
contact?  
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
6. Have you ever had someone log into your Facebook account without your knowledge or 
consent? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
7. Have you ever had an experience where you felt that your privacy had been compromised 
on Facebook? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
a. (If  answered YES to #7) Please briefly describe the 
experience:  _________________________________ 
I would rather not discuss the experience ___ 
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8. Have you ever had an experience where you felt that your privacy had been compromised 
on an online e-mail account, online bank account, or on the internet in general (outside of 
Facebook)? 
Yes _________   No __________ 
 
a. (If answered YES to #8) Please briefly describe the 
experience: 
_____________________________________ 
I would rather not discuss the experience ___ 
 
9. Have you ever viewed someone’s public Facebook profile to determine information 
about that individual?  
Yes _________   No __________ 
a. (If answered YES to #8) How often do you view public 
Facebook profiles when you want to know information 
about an individual? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Never            Almost always 
 
10. With 1 representing the most serious and 6 representing the least serious, please order the 
following online behaviours from 1-6 according to how serious you feel they are. For 
example, if each of these were to happen, consider which you would find the most and 
least problematic.  
___ Bullying/Harassment 
___ Somebody’s identity being stolen and used by someone else 
___ Deception for the purpose of financial gain   
___ Gossip 
___ Personal information being used to regularly track someone’s whereabouts and activities  
___ Third party companies using someone’s information  
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11. Jamie joined a Facebook group for players of Candy Crush Saga, a popular Facebook game. 
By joining the group, Jamie’s profile will now be made accessible to other members of the group. 
The information that others can see/ can be seen on Jamie’s profile includes:  First and Last 
name, Profile pic of self, Current city of residence, Hometown, Photos of pet and pet name, High 
school graduation class, Current University, Current workplace, Favourite music, movies, TV 
shows and books, Links to family profiles including Mother, Brother and Sister. 
11. Using check marks, indicate what information could lead Jamie to be at risk for the 
occurrences listed across the top? 
 Risks      




























First and Last name       
Profile pic of self       
Current city       
Hometown       
Photos of pet and pet 
name 
      
High school graduation 
class 
      
Current university       
Current workplace       
Favourite music, tv 
shows, movies & books 
      
Links to family profiles 
including mother, 
brother and sister 
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A friend informs Jamie that he received a message from Jamie’s Facebook profile. In the 
message, “Jamie” claimed to be stranded in a remote location and asked the friend to transfer 
money to Jamie’s bank account via e-mail (e-transfer). Jamie denies writing the message and is 
unable to log into Facebook because the password for the account has been changed.  
12. How concerned should Jamie be?   
1                2           3                4           5 
Not concerned at all                                       Very concerned 
 
13. How likely do you believe it is that Jamie’s friend would send the money?   
1                2           3                4           5 
Not likely                                               Very likely  
 
14. Which, if any of the following people do you feel would send the money? Please check 
all that apply. 
____ Romantic partner 
____ Grandparents 
____ Sibling  
____ Friend 
____ Parents 
____ Other (please specify) _______________________ 
 
Ending #1: Jamie later receives an e-mail from an unnamed stranger. The stranger’s e-mail says 
that he/she has revealing photographs that Jamie had exchanged in a private Facebook 
conversation with a Facebook friend. The stranger tells Jamie that he/she will release the 
photographs to Jamie’s close friends and family unless Jamie pays money.  Jamie does not want 
friends or family to see the photographs due to their nature.  
15. How likely do you think it is that Jamie would send the money? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Not likely                                               Very likely 
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16. What do you suggest Jamie do in this situation?  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. How responsible do you believe Jamie is for being in this dilemma? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Not at all responsible                          Completely responsible  
 
18. What is the likelihood that the individual who has control over Jamie’s Facebook account 
will be caught?  
1                2           3                4           5 
Not likely                                               Very likely  
 
Ending #2: The password to Jamie’s e-mail account has also been changed, meaning that Jamie 
cannot access any e-mails. Without this access, Jamie worries about sensitive information being 
available to whomever has changed the password. Jamie’s credit card statements, online 
purchases, student information and employee details all come through the same e-mail address. 
19. What do you suggest Jamie do in this situation?  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. How responsible do you believe Jamie is for being in this dilemma? 
1                2           3                4           5 
Not at all responsible                          Completely responsible  
 
21. What is the likelihood that the individual who has control over Jamie’s Facebook account 
will be caught?  
1                2           3                4           5 
Not likely                                               Very likely  
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22. A recent examination of the public profiles of 200 Facebook users indicates that: 
 83% (166) provided a profile picture of themselves 
 52.5% (105) publicized their hometown 
 48% (96) revealed the names of family members (including fiancé, spouse and 
in-laws) 
 11.5% (23) gave the name of a pet 
 53.5% (107) provided details about their education (i.e. elementary school, high 
school graduation year, college degree etc.) 
Information related to physical appearance, past locations, family members, pet names and 
education may be used to answer important security questions for online accounts. This puts users 
at risk for white-collar crimes such as fraud, Ponzi schemes and/or identity theft. Based on this 
information, how concerned are you that the details made public on your account may put you at 
risk?  
1                2           3                4           5 





Would you consent to having your profile assessed from a separate Facebook account to see what 
type of information is made available to the public?  
With your consent, your Facebook profile will be viewed from a Facebook account created solely 
and temporarily for the purpose of this study. After your profile has been studied, you will be 
provided with a summary of the information made available to the public on your profile. You 
will be asked to confirm the number of questions I can accurately answer with the information 
and you will be asked to answer some post-survey questions. Only your indication of the number 
of details I have accurately obtained in various categories (i.e favourite movie) will be used in the 
study. No personal information (i.e. the name of your favourite movie) will be collected or used. 
Your profile will remain anonymous and results will be analyzed using group, not individual, 
data. 
                                                 Please indicate with a checkmark () 
Yes, I give consent to have the nature (i.e. favourite movie) and accuracy (i.e. number of 
details) of information collected from my public profile used in the study.   __________ 
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Appendix C 
Survey of Online Behaviour (Debriefing screen) 
The purpose of this study is to examine perceptions of white-collar crime on the 
internet. White-collar crime occurs when those in positions of power use deception to 
make money. The information made available on Facebook profiles may put users at risk 
for white-collar crime. I want to study whether white-collar crime is perceived to be a 
serious online threat. Furthermore, I am interested in whether members of Facebook can 
recognize the risk for white-collar crime in a scenario where particular information is 
made available on a Facebook profile. I am also interested in public perceptions of online 
white-collar crime, including victim responsibility, risk to the individual’s security and 
the recommended course of action. I ask that until all results have been collected and 
analyzed that you do not discuss the specific nature of the study with others.  
All data collected is anonymous and will be kept confidential. Results will be 
analyzed as group data, not as individual data. If you have any questions or concerns 
about the study, feel free to contact myself at krose@grenfell.mun.ca or my supervisor, 
Dr. Kelly Warren, kwarren@grenfell.mun.ca. If you are interested in knowing the results 
of the study, you may contact myself or Dr. Kelly Warren any time after April 22
nd
, 2013. 
If this study raised any personal concerns for you, please contact a counsellor at Kids 
Help Phone via telephone 1-800-668-6868 or online at www.kidshelpphone.ca. You may 
also find more information about online safety at www.respect-yourself.ca or 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/is-si. Thank you for your time and cooperation in completing 
the survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
